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Abstract
A recent highly disputed subject of regulating energy markets in Europe is the unbundling of
vertically integrated down– and upstream firms. While legal unbundling is already implemented in
most countries and indisputable in its necessity for approaching regulatory aims, continuative models
as ownership unbundling or the alternative of an independent system operator are still ambiguous.
Hence, this article contributes to the economic analyses of identifying the differences of separate
types of unbundling. Via simulation, we find that legal unbundling brings about the lowest prices in
a market under Cournot competition. Moreover, under Bertrand competition, no differences between
legal unbundling and ownership unbundling can be identified.
1 Introduction
The energy supply industry is one of the most important sectors in a modern industrial economy. As
the price of electricity and gas increased continuously during the last few years, energy prices have been
brought back on the agenda of recent economic and political discussions. From a socially optimal point
of view, and due to the fact that energy is a basic need for humans in contemporary societies, regulatory
policy intends prices to be low enough to satisfy everyone’s basic needs, but, on the other hand, high
enough in order to compensate generators appropriately (for production).
One of the fundamentals of stable and fair energy prices is given by a proper regulatory framework in
order to stipulate the competition between companies, that depend on networks and are embedded in
a natural monopoly. An additional central argument for the privatisation of the energy industry was
the fact that private ownership leads to higher efficiency and lower production costs than public own-
ership. Nevertheless, these lower costs do not necessarily imply that profit maximising companies pass
the benefits onto customers, especially when the market allows price rigging. This emphasises the ne-
cessity for further reorganisation within the electricity sector towards more advanced regulatory methods.
In this context, a recent highly disputed subject concerns the unbundling of electricity companies. While
legal unbundling is already implemented in most countries and indisputable in its necessity for approach-
ing regulatory aims, continuative models as the separation of ownership and control (ownership un-
bundling) are ambiguous. Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) for example showed that ownership unbundling
may contribute to higher efficiency, but also leads to additional intransparencies and inefficient pricing,
which contradicts the regulatory scopes. Furthermore, Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007) criticised the concept
of ownership unbundling as they see no additional benefit to the already implemented legal unbundling,
for social welfare and competitive pricing. In contrast to this, Pollitt (2008) mentioned the advantages
of ownership unbundling through higher competition. Nevertheless the latest directive of the European
Commission Directive 2009/72/EC requests the implementation of ownership unbundling or the alter-
native of an independent system (ISO) or transmission (ITO) operator, which raises the interest in the
unbundling topic additionally.
While most of the articles up to now deal with the analysis of transmission or distribution firms, only
a few studies analyse the impact of unbundling on energy production units and the resulting level of
competition and prices at electricity spot markets. Hence, the following article analyses the impact of
different types of unbundling including a third possibility with endogenous determination of the grid
tariff. Herein, the resulting effects on concentration within the generating market and energy pricing
are examined. This is done by means of a simulation model, based on solving mixed complementary
problems (MCP).
Therefore, the remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section will give an overview
of the different types of unbundling and adjacent literature. Section 3 gives the model framework in
which legal unbundling, ownership unbundling and a third way with endogenous grid tariff rule are
differentiated. Then, the simulation models are calibrated with respect to German data in order to give
some insights, how unbundling affects competition and consumer prices, in a country which has not yet
implemented continuative models. Finally, we test the model’s sensitivity by means of a comparative
statics analysis. The last section summarises the findings and draws together the principal conclusions.
2 Literature and Regulatory Background
In the literature, the consequences of vertical integration in the electricity sector are frequently discussed
and emphasise the impact of these on competition and market entry. Prior to liberalisation, the vertical
character of firms in a natural monopoly position was seen as major advantage for cost of service charges
due to strong synergies and possible cross-subsidisations. Now, the existence of integrated upstream1
and downstream2 firms is assumed to hinder the evolution of effective competition and social welfare.
As a consequence, the European Commission implemented several stages of unbundling for overcoming
the previously mentioned problems. In a first step, accounting systems of each company division have to
be separated in order to assure proper and transparent cost application. A step further, leads to legal
unbundling which induces a separation of company parts under company law. Accordingly, discretionary
power is reduced while ownership of the certain parts remains at the parent company. The strongest form
of unbundling is given by ownership unbundling. Herein, the part forming the natural monopoly has to
be separated from the rest of the vertically integrated company, i.e. the network becomes an independent
and commercial operator which is neither subject to directives, nor owned by the holding company.
In Europe (EU–15), most countries have already implemented ownership unbundling as recent step in
liberalising the national electricity market. Nevertheless, some countries refuse realisation and focus on
a different framework, which should contribute to regulatory scopes but leaves ownership within the ver-
tically integrated company, as for example the independent system operator (ISO). This system allows
the transmission firm to operate independently, while ownership remains at the former holding companies.
In the last years, several articles dealing with consequences and (dis)advantages of these certain legal
structures came up. An influential article dealing with this is Joskow and Tirole (2000) who showed
that under the existence of vertically integrated companies with certain market power, the retaining of
transmission capacity allows them to increase profits. Based on this, also Joskow (2004) mentioned the
strong incentive for integrated companies to reduce capacities and to shift market power to the adjacent
generator. Additional studies, dealing with the possible discrimination of market entrants in upstream
or downstream markets were given by Mandy (2000), Beard et al. (2001), Mulder et al. (2005), Haucap
(2007), or Baarsma and de Nooij (2007). Moreover, Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) analysed the impact of
unbundling on allocative efficiency under Cournot competition. They found that ownership unbundling
increases a regulator’s efficiency, but is dominated by the resulting double marginalisation which implies
higher prices in the long run. Moreover, Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007) have to be mentioned in this context
who showed that demand and optimal output under legal unbundling are higher than under ownership
unbundling or vertical integration. By incorporating additional features in their model, as for example
price competition in downstream markets, they came to the conclusion that also consumer surplus and
overall welfare are not necessarily increased when implementing ownership unbundling (in comparison
to legal unbundling). Our model comes to a similar result indicating that legal unbundling may prevail
certain advantages for adjacent markets and should therefore be preferred to ownership unbundling.
With respect to the latter two articles, we implement a GAMS3 simulation model based on MCP4 when
analysing the impact of unbundling under Cournot5 and Bertrand6 competition at the upstream gener-
ation market. Similar simulation models are for example given by Andersson and Bergman (1995) or
1The term upstream firm refers to a grid operator.
2The term downstream firm refers to a producer of energy.
3GAMS is the abbreviation for General Algebraic Modelling System.
4MCP denotes the abbreviation for Mixed Complementary Problem.
5In a Cournot game, the firms face competition in quantities.
6In a Bertrand game, the firms face competition in prices.
2
Kopsakangas-Savolainen (2003). A more recent study using the systematics of MCP for simulating an
energy market can be found in Tanaka (2009), who analysed the Japanese wholesale electricity market
as a transmission–constrained Cournot market.
Based on the previously mentioned discussion and the existing simulation models covering the electricity
market, we implement three different frameworks for generating markets in which the agents play a
Cournot or Bertrand game. The frameworks are distinguished by the different regulatory setups. Herein,
legal unbundling, ownership unbundling and a third way with endogenous grid tariffs are analysed. Our
findings emphasise the existing degree of competition in the market, when implementing a new regulatory
framework. In a market with Bertrand competition the third way model leads to the most favourable
results for competition and prices, whereas legal unbundling seems only advantageous in a market with
Cournot competition. Ownership unbundling lies in between these cases, thus indicating no extraordinary
benefits or disadvantages with its introduction in this framework.
3 The Model
The underlying model is based on the numerical and static short–term model of conjectural variation
developed by Andersson and Bergman (1995) for Sweden which was afterwards applied by Kopsakangas-
Savolainen (2003) for the Finnish electricity market. Herein, conjectural variation refers to the possibility
of switching directly between Cournot– and Bertrand competition. Building on this, we start with the
description of the basic model which is extended afterwards in order to analyse the impact of different
types of unbundling on the generation market and the adjacent degree of concentration.
3.1 Basic model
The output of a single supplier (f) is defined as the sum of energy produced by hydro power plants
(Xhy), nuclear power plants (Xnuc) and thermal plants using fossil fuels (Xfos). Let F represent the
total number of energy producing firms in the market:
X(f) = Xhy(f) +Xnuc(f) +Xfos(f); for f = 1, 2, ..., F (1)
Total supply of electricity (SE) is thus defined as the sum of the individual firm’s supplies.
SE =
F∑
f=1
X(f); for f = 1, 2, ..., F (2)
In this model, we distinguish three different types of power plants, which implies a specification of three
different types of marginal cost functions. The marginal cost function for nuclear power plants is given
by:
∂Cnuc
∂Xnuc
(f) = cnuc; for f = 1, 2, ..., F (3)
Instead, hydro power production which comprises run–of–river as well as reservoir power plants yields a
marginal cost function of the following form:
∂Chy
∂Xhy
(f) = chy + λhy(f); for f = 1, 2, ..., F (4)
Where chy stands for the operating costs in run–of–river power plants and λ represents the shadow price
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of stored water. Intuitively, λ implies a firm specific scarcity rent on the deployment of reservoir power
plants. Only if the respective capacity of run–of–river power plants (Khy(f)) is fully utilised, λ is allowed
to deviate from zero. Given that production cannot exceed installed capacity7:
Xhy(f)−Khy(f) ≤ 0, (5)
and following Andersson and Bergman (1995), the variable λ has to fulfil the following equations:
λhy(f) · (Xhy(f)−Khy(f)) = 0; (6)
λhy(f) ≥ 0; (7)
Marginal costs in the category of energy production using fossil fuels are determined via a function, which
is exponential increasing in the degree of capacity utilisation:
∂Cfos
∂Xfos
(f) = ao + a1 ·
(
Xfos(f)
Kfos(f)
)σ
; for f = 1, 2, ..., F (8)
The parameter a0 stands for the marginal costs of the cheapest production type in this category. In
our case this is determined by power plants using brown coal which determines the starting value of the
cost function. The second part mentions a markup on these unit costs which applies as soon as more
expensive fossil fuels (stone coal, gas, or oil) enter the production process. This markup depends on the
degree of capacity utilisation, expressed as quotient of the produced amount (Xfos(f)) of each firm and
its available capacity (Kfos(f)) in this category and ranges from 0 to 1. The parameter σ represents
the speed of adjustment in marginal costs, when converging to full capacity deployment. It has to be
greater than unity, which results in an exponential increase of marginal costs with respect to capacity
utilisation. The possible evolution of this cost function is represented in Figure 1. Intuitively, a marginal
cost function of the presented shape is needed for thermal power plants using fossil fuels in order to
represent the distinct differences in marginal costs within this category (as also shown in section 4).
Figure 1: Marginal costs of the production in thermal power plants
Opposed to the producers in the market are the consumers, which are depicted by the following demand
7Installed capacity was entered as maximum production in MWh, given the installed capacity in MW.
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for electricity (DE):
DE = D0 ·
(
PE
P0
)ǫ
+NEX; (9)
Where ǫ stands for the price elasticity of demand and PE for the actual market price. D0 and P0 describe
the previous demand and price for energy, respectively. The parameter NEX stands for net exports and
is exogenously given.
Thus, the inverse demand function is given as:
PE = P0 ·
(∑F
f=1X(f)−NEX
D0
) 1
ǫ
; (10)
In order to accommodate demand, produced electricity has to be transported to final consumers. For
this, the transmission and distribution network is used, which is an additional cost factor for generating
firms. Let Pnet represent the transportation costs for each unit supplied. Assuming further that each
generator aims to maximise profits (implicitly also optimising the power plant mix), yields the following
profit function8:
Π(f) = PE ·X(f)− C(f)− Pnet ·X(f); for f = 1, 2, ..., F (11)
Herein, revenues (PE ·X(f)) are reduced by costs (C(f)) and transportation costs (Pnet). Recall, C(f)
represents the respective cost function which has to be inserted according to the power plants used in
the production process, while Pnet and PE represent unit prices.
9
Within our setup, the parameter of conjectural variation (Θ) is included into the first order condition
(FOC) which allows simulating of and switching between Bertrand and Cournot competition:10
PE +
1
ǫ
· (1 + Θ) ·
X(f)
SE
· PE =
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
+ Pnet; (12)
If Θ = 0, the model simulates Cournot competition, whereas Θ = −1 depicts the Bertrand framework.11
3.2 The introduction of unbundling
For introducing unbundling into the above mentioned framework, we refer to Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007)
who distinguished the different types of unbundling with respect to the resulting profit maximisation
problems of up– and downstream firms.
For this, we incorporate three different types of firms in our model - vertically integrated enterprises
(VIE) which operate in production as well as in transmission and distribution sector, pure generators
and pure transmission and distribution operators. The downstream firms of the legal unbundled VIEs
are subsumed under g = 1, 2, ..., G, with G ⊂ F .
For further analysis, it is assumed that transportation charges are regulated, i.e. under legal and owner-
ship unbundling the grid operators are only allowed to set prices (Pnet) at the permitted level. Neverthe-
less, regulation is assumed not to be perfect which implies that allowed prices do not necessarily equal
real marginal costs. In order to account for this feature of concealment, an additional parameter (d) is
included in the models of legal and ownership unbundling. In opposite to this, for modeling the third
way, no exogenous price ceiling exists.
8Note that this profit function and according FOC refer in the following to a stand alone generator.
9Π(f) = Π(f)[PE , Pnet, X(f), Chy , Cnuc, Cfos]; for f = 1, 2, ..., F .
10For a detailed derivation see Appendix A.
11For further insights into the setup of conjectural variation, see for example Andersson and Bergman (1995).
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3.2.1 Legal Unbundling (LU)
In contrast to unregulated vertically integrated enterprises which aim to maximise the profit of the
whole company, legal unbundling implies the legal separation of the up - and downstream firms. In this
context, the grid operator is only allowed to optimise its own operative business, while the downstream
firm incorporates the profit of the upstream firm, additionally.
Πup = Πup and Π
LU
down = Πdown +Πup (13)
Hence, the profit function of a network operating company is composed of revenues, given as product of
the regulated grid tariff (Pnet) and the aggregated amount of energy produced (SE), subtracted by the
adjacent marginal costs of operating the network (m) and the fixed costs (Fix).12
Πup = Pnet · SE −m · SE − Fix; (14)
Under legal unbundling, the profit function of the downstream firm which belongs to the same corporation
as a network company, is given by:
ΠLUdown = PE ·X(g)− C(g)− Pnet ·X(g) + Pnet · SE −m · SE − Fix, for g = 1, 2, ..., G; G ⊂ F. (15)
After reshuffling terms, the FOC13 states:
PE +
1
ǫ
· (1 + Θ) ·
X(g)
SE
· PE + Pnet · (1 + Θ) =
∂C(g)
∂X(g)
+ Pnet +m · (1 + Θ); (16)
Compared to the optimality condition stated in Equation 12, Equation 16 is expanded by the terms
Pnet · (1 + Θ) on the left hand side and m · (1 + Θ) on the right hand side, visualising the differences
between Cournot and Bertrand competition.
In case of a Cournot competition where Θ = 0, the integrated company considers the upstream firmsm´arginal
costs denoted by m which are lower than the allowed grid tariff and determined as follows:
m = Pnet · (1− d), (17)
where d represents the concealment parameter, expressing the percentage difference to the grid tariff.14
In contrast to that, the effect of sharing a holding company with a net operator vanishes under Bertrand
competition, as the two additional parts drop out by setting Θ = −1, which results in prices equalling
marginal costs.
3.2.2 Ownership Unbundling (OU)
The second case of unbundling refers to ownership unbundling in which the vertically integrated enter-
prises have to sell their transmission facilities to an independent company. Thus, both, the grid operator
12Note, for a country with N > 1 grid operators, SE has to be multiplied with
Knet(n)
NET
, representing the grid operators
share in the total network capacity.
13For a detailed derivation of the first order condition see Appendix B.
14Note that this specification is used in order to be able to enter exact data for the regulated grid tariff. It is included in
all three scenarios.
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as separated firm and the producer of energy maximise their own profits, which creates space for potential
double marginalisation.
Πup = Πup and Π
OU
down = Πdown (18)
Hence, the profit function of the upstream firm is again given by:
Πup = Pnet · SE −m · SE − Fix; (19)
The energy producing firms face the same optimality condition, as derived in Section 3.1, which is given
by:
PE +
1
ǫ
· (1 + Θ) ·
X(f)
SE
· PE =
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
+ Pnet (20)
3.2.3 Third way
Finally, we compare the two scenarios of legal and ownership unbundling with a framework in which the
grid operator sets the grid tariff endogenously. More precisely, this operator sets the grid tariff always
equal to the sum of marginal costs (m) plus a shadow price if grid capacity becomes scarce (λnet). This
considered third way goes in line with the highly disputed third alternative of an independent system
operator, as the transmission facilities of all companies are subsumed in an independent firm which
is owned by former system operators. Nevertheless, in recent discussions the ISO is presented as a
profit maximising institution, thus exhibiting too less differences to the ownership unbundling scenario
modeled within our framework. Therefore, in this third way we refer to a more social endogenous grid
tariff setting. In this setup, the simulation of the energy producing firms equals the situation under
ownership unbundling, with FOC stated in equation 20.
The profit function of the grid operator is again given by:
Πup = Pnet · SE −m · SE − Fix; (21)
The main difference lies in the price setting of the transmission operator. Here, the independent firm is
not subject to grid tariff regulation but sets prices endogenously such that:
m+ λnet = Pnet; (22)
The lower bound for the grid tariff is given by marginal costs of net operation (m). Similar to the case of
hydro power plants, the grid operator is allowed to set grid tariffs containing a markup λnet on marginal
costs, which represents a scarcity rent if the transmission capacities are nearly exhausted. Given that
electricity supply cannot exceed net capacity:
SE −Knet ≤ 0, (23)
the variable λnet can be defined by the following equations:
λnet · (SE −Knet) = 0; (24)
λnet ≥ 0; (25)
In our setup, the optimality conditions of the single producers of energy, combined with their respec-
tive capacity constraints and the market clearing condition constitute a mixed complementary problem
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(MCP). For analysing the advantages of the different types of unbundling, we concentrate on the resulting
quantities, prices, profits and market concentration. With respect to these, we are able to give insights
into the socially optimal type of regulation and the adjacent disadvantages and advantages.
4 Market data
In order to analyse the different unbundling scenarios, the simulation model is calibrated with respect to
data from Germany, as it forms an important transmission market for Europe and gives a good example
of country, which had not implemented the third legislative package until 2008. All data refer to the year
2008. The price of electricity on the spot market of the European Energy Exchange (EEX) reaches an
average value of 65.76 e
MWh
in 2008, while the minimum and maximum price were given by 21.03 e
MWh
and 131.4 e
MWh
, respectively. For the simulations, we refer to a price of 42.84 e
MWh
, which establishes the
ten percent quantile of the observed prices.15 These values also constitute the borders for the sensitivity
analysis in section 5.2. The domestic electricity demand in Germany is given by 616.6 TWh plus 22.5
TWh net exports, as reported by the Federal Statistical Office (2009). In the following, the considered
data for the power plant mix, the marginal costs of production, the price elasticity of demand and CO2
certificate prices are described.
4.1 Power plant mix
The German power plant mix consists of hydro, nuclear and thermal power plants, as well as renewable
energy, generated by windmill and photo voltaic plants. Table 1 gives an overview of the installed
capacity of the different energy producers in Germany and their according market shares. The six biggest
producers encompass 88.59% of installed capacities. All firms with market shares below one percent are
subsumed in the so–called Fringe. Overall, the model’s approximation of installed capacities aggregates
to 98,723.6 MW which accounts for 99.39% of the real installed capacity in Germany of 99,332.9 MW.
The remaining 0.61% of overall production capacities referring to windmill-powered and photo voltaic
plants are not included in the simulation.16 Using the presented market shares for the German energy
generating sector in 2008, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Inedx (HHI)17 reaches a level of 1,816 points which
indicates a high level of concentration.18
15We use the 10% qunatile instead of the mean, in order to prevent unrealistic increases in domestic demand, which are
only driven by relative price decreases.
16The German Federal Environment Agency records power plants starting from 100MW, therefore the relative share of
windmill and photo voltaic plants is that small.
17The HHI is a measure for market concentration. It is solely driven by market shares and caluclated by:
HHI =
F∑
f=0
s2f ; f = 0, 1, 2, ..., F (26)
Herein, s2
f
gives the squared market share of active companies within a certain market.
18See for example Tupa and Ellersdorfer (2005), who also found high concentration on the German electricity generating
sector.
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Table 1: Market Shares of Producers of Electricity in 2008
Firm Capacity in MW Market share in %
Hydro Fossil Nuclear Sum
Firm 1 179.7 18,397.4 5,766 24,343.1 24.51
Firm 2 1,471.2 14,293.5 8,571 24,335.7 24.50
Firm 3 2,550 12,621 2,496 17,667 17.79
Firm 4 334 4,871.5 4,624 9,829.5 9.90
Firm 5 0 5,447.1 0 5,447.1 5.48
Firm 6 0 6,378.5 0 6,378.5 6.42
Fringe 3,008.7 7,714 0 10,722.7 10.79
Sum 7,543.6 69,723 21,457 98,723.6 99.39
Source: German Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt)
4.2 CO2 certificate prices
Since 2005, CO2 certificates are traded at the EEX. The EEX carbon index (Carbix)19 reached a minimum
value of 0.01 and maximum value of 29.95 e per ton CO2. In order to analyse whether CO2 prices
influence the efficiency of different types of regulation or its impact on market concentration and energy
prices, we distinguish three different cases for emission certificate prices in the sensitivity analysis. Herein,
the CO2 price can take the values 0, 8 and 38 e per ton CO2, which covers the whole range of historical
prices at the Carbix and leaves space for future increases.
4.3 Marginal costs of production
The marginal costs of energy production, differentiated by the three different types of power plants, are
set with respect to Wissel et al. (2008) and highlighted in Figure 2. The cost components encompass
prices for the primary energy carriers, operating costs and costs for CO2 certificates with reference values
of 8 or 38 e per ton CO2, respectively.20
19Carbix means Carbon Index and it is calculated and published by the European Energy Exchange (EEX). The EEX
computes the Carbix as auction price, which is calculated according to the Principle of Most Executable Volume.
20Note that the shares referring to 38 e per ton CO2 only contain the respective markup from 8 to 38 e per ton CO2.
Recall, the costs for CO2 certificates depend on the primary energy carrier, the effectiveness and the technology of the
power plants and are therefore not added to all power plants at the same extent.
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Figure 2: Marginal costs of different power plant categories
Source: Wissel et al. (2008)
As it is not possible to obtain a unique regulated grid tariff for Germany, we refer to the average variable
costs, requested from the four network operators in Germany21, which yields a reference value of d =
1.36 e
MWh
.22 Recall, the marginal costs of network operation enter our simulation in dependency of the
grid tariff, using a formulation via concealment.
4.4 Price elasticity of demand
The price elasticity of demand enters the simulation model as exogenous parameter. Historically, the
demand was expected to be quite inelastic as electricity is hardly substitutable and not storable. Several
empirical studies deal with the estimation of certain price elasticities in the electricity sector. Bohi
(1981) for example mentioned that the short-run elasticity for aggregate electricity varies between -0.03
and 0.54. Concerning long–term elasticities, he found values ranging from -0.45 to -2.1. In recent years,
the measures for elasticity include further analysis of time–of–use pricing. Herein, the demand elasticities
are divided into peak, off–peak, as well as private and business customer elasticities, which range from
-0.02 to -2.57. A sample of studies and their results are listed in Lafferty et al. (2001).
For the base case of the following simulation, we refer to different studies, e.g. Filippini (1999) who
estimated a price elasticity of demand for wholesale customers of −0.30 for Switzerland. Additionally
a study from NIEIR (2004), which estimated the price elasticities of a variety of Australian consumer
groups, also arrives at a price elasticity of −0.35 for commercial consumers. In order to cope with the
range of estimated price elasticities of demand and to monitor the sensitivity of the model, we allow the
price elasticity of demand to vary between −0.15 and −1.
21EnBW Transportnetze AG, E.On Netz GmbH, RWE Transportnetz Strom GmbH and Vattenfall Europe Transmission
GmbH.
22Although the grid tariff is usually a transitory item for the generators, it is explicitly modelled here. Recall, we only refer
to marginal costs as we neglect the demand charge.
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5 Simulation Results
The simulation results are divided into two parts. First, we analyse the effects of the different types
of unbundling on energy prices, quantities produced, and gained market concentration. The second
part gives insights into the sensitivity and interdependencies between results and parameters included.
Therefore, we allow elasticities, initial prices, concealment power and CO2 prices to vary.
5.1 Effects of different types of unbundling — Reference scenario
The starting values for the analysis derived in Section 4 are summarised by the following table.
Table 2: Data for the reference scenario
Parameter Reference value
Price elasticity of demand -0.35
Concealment parameter 0.2
CO2 costs in e per ton CO2 0
base price in e 42.84
base demand in TWh 616.6
base net exports in TWh 22.5
σ 2
Notes: The concealment parameter states that marginal net operating costs lie 20% below the grid tariff. σ is the
exponent of the marginal cost function in power plants using fossil fuels.
Table 3 presents the results for the different unbundling scenarios obtained under Cournot and Bertrand
competition.
Cournot Results When referring to energy prices, legal unbundling achieves the most preferable
results under Cournot competition. The worst performance according to social welfare is gained under
the scenario of an independent system operator, while ownership unbundling can be found in between
theses two extremes. In this case, production is highest under legal unbundling, because the integrated
downstream firms take marginal costs of grid operation into account, which are lower than the grid tariff
considered by the companies that operate in the generation sector solely. This results in lower energy
prices under legal unbundling.
In order to compensate the negative effect of switching from legal to ownership unbundling, the grid tariff
has to be reduced by 18.65%, which would result in equal prices for legal and ownership unbundling.23
As the concealment parameter in the reference secnario was set to 0.2 this means that the regulatory
authority would have to diminish the concealment possibilities of the grid operators. In other words,
it needs distinct effort from the regulatory authority to achieve small changes in the market conditions
for consumers, i.e. a decrease in grid tariffs of 18.65% would result in a decrease in the prevailing price
for electricity of 0.41%. In opposite to energy prices, if market concentration is the major focus of
regulatory authorities, the order reverses. In this case, the third way provides the lowest level of market
concentration, while legal unbundling is characterised by higher concentration. Ownership unbundling
lies again in between the two extremes. This reversed order is not surprising, as higher prices imply the
option to produce in comparatively expensive power plants and thus provide the possibility for smaller
producers to increase their market shares. In our static framework, the increasing concentration is caused
by the asymmetric power plant capacities of the producers. Nevertheless, as the HHI only varies in a
range of four points between the different unbundling scenarios under Cournot competition, the impact
of unbundling on market concentration is rather small.
23This percentage change of the grid tariff was determined by calibration.
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Bertrand Results In contrast to the results under Cournot competition, the stronger competition in
the Bertrand scenario leads to a situation in which the most desirable result is reached by the frame-
work with independent system operator, who is able to set the grid tariff according to the degree of net
utilisation. As expected, the results under legal unbundling and ownership unbundling are identical24
and provide a slightly higher price for electricity than the independent system operator. Consequently,
production is highest under the third way framework. Nevertheless, as under Cournot competition, the
relationship between prices for electricity and market concentration remains unchanged, such that ac-
cording to market concentration, the framework of an independent system operator is less advantageous
than legal or ownership unbundling. Furthermore, the lower prices for electricity under Bertrand com-
petition also lead to an increase in market concentration, above the critical value of 1,800, indicating
weak competition. This increase is caused by the asymmetry of the installed power plant capacities in
the market.
Table 3: Impact of unbundling under Cournot and Bertrand competition
Case Production in TWh % of LU Price in
e
MWh
% of LU HHI
Cournot
Legal Unbundling (LU) 654 100 39.99 100 1679
Ownership Unbundling 653 99.85 40.18 100.45 1675
Third Way 652 99.69 40.34 100.88 1671
Bertrand
Legal Unbundling (LU) 714 100 30.91 100 1808
Ownership Unbundling 714 100 30.91 100 1808
Third Way 715 100.14 30.73 99.42 1808
Notes: The legal unbundling scenario is used as reference case, as it is the prevailing regulatory framework in Germany.
Hence, prices and production are given in absolute values and as percentage of LU. Last, the HHI is added to each
scenario, in order to visualise the prevailing concentration in the market.
Moreover, our simulation results point out that the optimal production mix of each firm is independent
from the prevailing regulatory framework. The changes in the used power plant mix only fluctuate within
a one percent range. Exemplifying, Figure 3 and Figure 8 present the resulting production mix under
legal unbundling for Cournot and Bertrand competition, respectively. Herein, all firms fully deploy their
available capacities in hydro and nuclear power plants, whereas only firms g4, f5 and f6 run their thermal
plants at full capacity in a Cournot framework.
24Recall, the parameter of conjectural variation is set to -1 for Bertrand competition, wherefore all additional parts drop
out and the optimality condition reduces for all firms to marginal costs equalling the price for electricity.
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Figure 3: Production Mix under Cournot competition
5.2 Structural analysis
In order to confirm the ranking of the different unbundling scenarios, a structural analysis is conducted.
Herein, the concealment parameter, the price elasticity of demand, the base price anchor as well as the
prices for CO2 certificates are varied.
In the following, we mainly concentrate on the results obtained under Cournot competition. Nevertheless,
similar sensitivities can be obtained for the Bertrand framework.25
5.2.1 Concealment parameter
The concealment capability (d) is taken into consideration for the scenarios of legal and ownership un-
bundling, resulting in a possible difference between the grid tariff and marginal costs of grid operation.
In opposite to this, the transmission company in the third way scenario has no incentive to conceal true
costs, such that it is assumed to request a markup on marginal costs only if the net capacity converges
to its limit. The potential consequences of concealment are examined by varying d between 0 and 1.
While d = 1 implies full concealment capability, d = 0 indicates perfect regulation by circumventing
any markups on marginal costs.26 The resulting price levels for the different unbundling scenarios are
visualized by Figure 4.
Under ownership unbundling all downstream firms pay a grid tariff of 1.36 e
MWh
. Consequently, con-
cealment power and resulting lower marginal costs of grid operation, only affect the profits of the grid
operators, whereas the market price of electricity is independent to changes in d. In the remaining two
scenarios, the price for electricity varies in a range of about 1 e
MWh
. In case of legal unbundling, conceal-
ment power leads to lower marginal costs for the integrated downstream firms, who consequently increase
their optimal electricity production. Thus, increasing concealment power is accompanied by lower prices
for electricity under legal unbundling. Last, concealment power implicitly also affects an independent
system operator, as marginal costs of grid operation are equal for all unbundling scenarios. Consequently,
lower concealment power under legal and ownership unbundling enters the third way via higher marginal
costs of grid operation, resulting in a higher price for electricity.
25The results for the Bertrand framework are available from the authors upon request.
26Note, the marginal costs of grid operation are equal for all three scenarios, whereas the grid tariff is allowed to differ
according to concealment power and the possible markup in the third way scenario for exhausted net capacity.
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Without any concealment possibilities (d = 0), the price for electricity under legal unbundling and
ownership unbundling coincides. But as long as concealment power exists, consumers are provided with
lower prices for electricity under legal unbundling than under ownership unbundling. This difference
is driven by the four big electricity producers in the simulated market, which constitute the integrated
downstream firms under legal unbundling and, consequently, take lower marginal costs into account than
the same firms under ownership unbundling. Referring to the third way, the transparency of setting the
grid tariff influences the strategic behaviour of the downstream firms. Although the relation between legal
unbundling and the third way alternative remains nearly unchanged, downstream firms decrease their
production in comparison to the legal unbundling scenario in order to exploit the advantages of lower grid
tariffs and higher electricity prices. Thus, the resulting price for electricity is higher under endogenous
price setting (third way) than under legal unbundling. Nevertheless, for values of d between 0.3 and 1, the
resulting lower grid tariff in the third way is sufficient to achieve an overall lower price for electricity than
under ownership unbundling. For d <0.3, this sufficiency vanishes and the price for electricity exceeds
prices under ownership unbundling. To summarise, Figure 4 points out that the relation of the different
unbundling scenarios strongly depends on the possibility for upstream firms to conceal their true marginal
costs of grid operation. Whereas ownership unbundling is the least favourable alternative in a situation
with full concealment (d = 1), it loses its comparative disadvantages with diminishing concealment.
Figure 4: Price development under varying concealment parameter
Next, Figure 5 emphasises the trade–off between market concentration and the price for electricity. The
concentration in the market, measured via the HHI, is decreasing with increasing prices. Intuitively,
increasing prices are accompanied by decreasing production, and because bigger firms are able to con-
duct more significant reductions (in relatively expensive power plants), market concentration decreases.
Thus, ownership unbundling leads to lower market concentration than legal unbundling for the whole
range of concealment capabilities. Surprisingly, the third way yields lower concentration than ownership
unbundling, although it additionally yields lower prices and is therefore able to break this trade–off. 27
27The corresponding results for Bertrand competition can be found in the Appendix D.
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Figure 5: HHI development under varying concealment parameter
5.2.2 Price elasticity of demand
Varying the price elasticity of demand, does not change the ranking of the different unbundling scenarios
due to electricity prices and the HHI. Nevertheless, the price elasticity of demand is an important factor
for market prices of electricity. Figure 6 shows the resulting price development for electricity under legal
unbundling, when varying the price elasticity of demand between -0.15 and -1. Starting from a quite low
level of -0.15, with increasing the elasticity of demand significant price decreases are observable.
In our simulations, the minimum price of 48.15 e
MWh
is reached at ǫ = −0.44. From this point, the
increase in marginal costs due to further production expansions outweighs the price reductions, resulting
from an increase in the price elasticity. At ǫ = −0.71, the capacity limit of the power plant mix of the
economy is exhausted, such that further price increases are necessary for mitigating demand. Therefore,
the observed price increases in our results, with ǫ > | − 0.44|, are driven by the static environment of
the underlying model and would mark the necessity for further investments in production capacities in
reality.
Figure 6: Price development under varying price elasticity of demand
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5.2.3 Initial price (p0)
Additionally, the dependence of the simulation results on the entered initial price for electricity is ex-
amined. Therefore, the development of the price for electricity is analysed for base prices between 16.95
e
MWh
and 161.39 e
MWh
, representing the minimal and maximal values for electricity traded at the EEX
in 2008. Subject to these variations, the resulting price for electricity in our simulation varies between
29.31 and 82.34 e
MWh
which constitutes a rather big variation. Moreover, it emphasises the base price as
being an important anchor for the simulation analysis which requires careful calibration. Nevertheless,
these price changes do not affect the ranking of the different unbundling scenarios.
5.2.4 Varying CO2 prices
Finally, the consequences of increasing costs for CO2 certificates, that affect the marginal costs of energy
production in thermal power plants, using fossil fuels, are examined. Therefore, three different situations
concerning the costs of CO2 certificates are distinguished, namely 0, 8 and 38 e per ton CO2.
Subject to these variation, the ranking of the different unbundling scenarios remains unchanged, which
confirms the previous results. Beside this, the nominal values of several variables are affected by an
increase in the costs of CO2 certificates. Table 4 presents an overview of the resulting changes, when
increasing the price for CO2 certificates from 0 to 8 and finally to 38 e per ton CO2. The increased
costs for CO2 certificates trigger a rise in marginal costs which results in an increase in the prices for
electricity. Due to the increased prices for electricity and the reduced amount produced in expensive
power plants using fossil fuels, the profits of all producers of electricity are increased.
Table 4: Effects of CO2 certificates
Variable 0
e
t CO2
8
e
t CO2
38
e
t CO2
a0 in
e
MWh
13.45 20.65 47.65
a1 in
e
MWh
22.51 17.79 3.49
Price in e
MWh
48.79 52.44 73.28
Production in TWh 726 709 633
Production hydro in TWh 33 33 33
Production fossil in TWh 505 488 412
Production nuclear in TWh 188 188 188
HHI 1,762 1,740 1,650
Profit Int(g1) in e million 4,810 5,090 6,590
Profit Int(g2) in e million 4,360 4,400 4,800
Profit Int(g3) in e million 2,800 2,940 3,580
Profit Int(g4) in e million 1,980 2,180 3,380
Profit f1 in e million 491 541 889E
Profit f2 in e million 637 701 1,150
Profit f3 in e million 1,120 1,240 2,000
Notes: a0 refers to the minimal marginal costs in thermal power plants. a1 describes the difference between minimal and
maximal marginal costs in thermal power plants. Int(g) denotes the certain integrated company, whereas f refers to a
downstream firm solely operating in the production market.
Figure 7 presents the development of the production mix with increasing prices for CO2 certificates in
comparison to the composition of the installed capacities.28 The installed capacities of hydro and nuclear
power plants are fully deployed in all three scenarios. But, the production in thermal power plants, which
is subject to increased marginal costs of production decreases recognisably, thus leading to an increase
28Note that the daily service life of hydro power plants only reaches twelve hours. Therefore hydro power plants lose in
percentage proportion compared to the capacities, which refer to the maximum amount of energy which can be produced
in one hour.
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in the percentage of the other two categories. Consequently, the introduction of CO2 certificates will
result in a shifting of production from thermal power plants to less pollutant power plants (although in
the current state more expensive). Nevertheless, the resulting price increases for consumers must not be
neglected.
Figure 7: Production mix under varying prices for CO2 certificates
6 Concluding remarks
Motivated by Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Commission, this paper examines the unbundling
alternatives of legal and ownership unbundling as well as a third way implementing an endogenous price
setting rule. The decision variables for ranking the different alternatives are the price for electricity with
the adjacent produced quantity and the level of market concentration, measured via the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index. This analysis is done by means of a simulation model, formulated as MCP and solved
in GAMS. The model is calibrated using data from the German electricity market.
We find that with respect to the electricity price, legal unbundling generates the most favourable con-
ditions for consumers under Cournot competition, whereas the third way alternative yields the highest
prices. Ownership unbundling, as the advised alternative of the European Commission, lies in between
these two extremes, thus indicating no extraordinary benefits or disadvantages with its implementation.
In order to compensate the negative effect of switching from the first best solution (legal unbundling)
to ownership unbundling, the grid tariff has to be reduced by about 18.65%. This implies a rather high
percentage for price inducements and the necessity to diminish the concealment possibilities of grid op-
erators via regulation. With a view to market concentration, the order of the different scenarios reverses
which highlights a trade–off relation between market concentration and the associated price for electricity.
In contrast to that, under prevailing Bertrand competition, legal unbundling and ownership unbundling
yield identical results and the third way is most advisable, when referring to the price of electricity.
Bertrand–competition is modelled via the optimality condition of prices equalling marginal costs. This
implies that a transmission company with social endogenous price setting rule becomes more advanta-
geous with increasing competition in the market. Thus, the prevailing degree of competition should be
taken into account by regulatory authorities while deciding in favour of one of these unbundling alter-
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natives. Nevertheless, the trade–off relation between market concentration and the price for electricity
remains.
In an environment containing regulated grid tariffs, the only possibility for grid operators to maximise
their profit is to manipulate their marginal costs of grid operating. One obvious possibility refers to
reducing marginal costs by according investments in order to increase the difference between the grid
tariff and costs and, therefore, maximise profits. Another option is to increase marginal costs in order to
receive a higher grid tariff, allotted from the regulatory authority. This would for example be possible
under legal unbundling by shifting costs from the producer to the grid operator. Both options would
require a dynamic setup to be analysed, wherefore the dynamisation of the presented model would be an
interesting extension.
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APPENDIX
A Integration of the parameter of conjectural variation for sep-
arate downstream firms
The starting point for the simulation model with separated downstream firms builds the derivative of the
profit function with respect to the produced amount of electricity.
∂πf
∂X(f)
= PE +
∂PE
∂X(f)
·X(f)−
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
− Pnet = 0; (27)
As the price for electricity depends on the aggregated amount of electricity, SE has to be included in the
derivation of PE with respect to X(f).
PE +
∂PE
∂SE
·
∂SE
∂X(f)
·X(f)−
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
− Pnet = 0; (28)
The next steps refer to expanding the second summand by the two factors SE
SE
and PE
PE
and reshuffling
terms:
PE +
∂PE
∂SE
·
∂SE
∂X(f)
·X(f) ·
SE
SE
·
PE
PE
−
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
− Pnet = 0; (29)
PE +
∂PE
∂SE
SE
PE︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
∂SE
∂X(f)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
X(f)
SE
· PE =
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
+ Pnet; (30)
PE +
1
ǫ
· (1 + Θ) ·
X(f)
SE
· PE =
∂C(f)
∂X(f)
+ Pnet; (31)
Finally, we end up with the expression for the optimality condition stated in Section 3.1. Note, ∂SE
∂X(f) =
∂(X(f)+X(−f))
∂X(f) = (1 + Θ). Herein, X(−f) represents the supply of energy (SE) without X(f) and thus
Θ stands for the derivation of X(−f) with respect to X(f).
B Integration of the parameter of conjectural variation for in-
tegrated downstream firms
The starting point for the model with integrated downstream firm is the derivative of the profit function
with respect to the produced amount of electricity.
∂ΠLUdown
∂X(g)
= PE +
∂PE
∂X(g)
·X(g)−
∂C(g)
∂X(g)
− Pnet + Pnet ·
∂SE
∂X(g)
−m ·
∂SE
∂X(g)
= 0; (32)
As earlier mentioned, the price for electricity depends on the aggregated amount of electricity, such that
SE has to be included in the derivation of PE with respect to X(g).
PE +
∂PE
∂SE
·
∂SE
∂X(g)
·X(g)−
∂C(g)
∂X(g)
− Pnet + Pnet ·
∂SE
∂X(g)
−m ·
∂SE
∂X(g)
= 0; (33)
Again, expanding and reshuffling terms, yields:
PE +
∂PE
∂SE
·
∂SE
∂X(g)
·X(g) ·
SE
SE
·
PE
PE
−
∂C(g)
∂X(g)
− Pnet + Pnet ·
∂SE
∂X(g)
−m ·
∂SE
∂X(g)
= 0; (34)
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PE +
∂PE
∂SE
SE
PE︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
∂SE
∂X(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
X(g)
SE
· PE + Pnet ·
∂SE
∂X(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸ =
∂C(g)
∂X(g)
+ Pnet +m ·
∂SE
∂X(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸; (35)
PE +
1
ǫ
· (1 + Θ) ·
X(g)
SE
· PE + Pnet · (1 + Θ) =
∂C(g)
∂X(g)
+ Pnet +m · (1 + Θ); (36)
Finally, we end up with the expression for the optimality condition stated in Section 3.2.1. Note that
∂SE
∂X(g) =
∂(X(g)+X(−g))
∂X(g) = (1 + Θ). Herein, X(−g) represents the supply of energy (SE) without X(g),
and thus, Θ stands for the derivation of X(−g) with respect to X(g).
C Production mix under Bertrand competition
Figure 8: Production Mix under Bertrand competition
Notes: Figure 8 illustrates a rather similar production mix as under Cournot competition which appears to be very similar
to the production mix under Cournot competition. The production mix under Bertrand competition is rather similar
to the one presented in Figure 3 under Cournot competition. Nevertheless, due to lower prices for electricity, the optimal
production level for each firm increases. Therefore, the available capacities in hydro and nuclear power plants are again fully
deployed by each firm. Additionally, the aggregated production in thermal power plants using fossil fuels increases about
14.29%, including a slight reallocation of production between the single firms. Firm g4 slightly decreases its production in
thermal plants, whereas all other firms increase production. In this scenario, although firms f5, f6 and f7 fully deploy
their installed capacities in thermal power plants, the relative increase (of energy production with fossil fuels) is higher for
the integrated producers g1, g2, g3, g4 which also trigger the increase in market concentration.
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D Concealment power under Bertrand competition
Figure 9: Price development under varying concealment parameter
Notes: Under Bertrand competition all downstream firms optimise profits such that prices equal marginal costs. Con-
sequently, concealment power only affects the profits of the grid operators. Legal and ownership unbundling provide an
identical market concentration and price for electricity for all values of d. The most interesting result under Bertrand
competition is given under the endogenous price setting approach (third way), as it is forced to provide a grid tariff equal
to its marginal costs. Therefore, the firms lose their possibility to use their production decisions strategically. This results
in a scenario, where the third way alternative provides a lower price for electricity than legal and ownership unbundling,
for all values of d.29
29Due to the high production under Bertrand competition, which nearly reaches the capacity limits of the single firms, the
slight price changes between the different unbundling scenarios do not trigger noticeable effects on market concentration.
Therefore, we abstain from a graphical illustration of the development of the HHI.
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